Is Send from Gmail (by Google) safe?
We analyzed Send from Gmail (by Google) version 1.17's actual code and gave it a 78/100 trust score. This is a purpose-aligned Gmail sharing extension…
Bottom line
This is a purpose-aligned Gmail sharing extension with broad page access but no established abuse or dangerous remote control.
What it can access
It can run on every HTTP and HTTPS page and alter mail links, while a click can share selected text and page details with Gmail.[Q1][Q2][Q3][Q6]
Security weaknesses
Broad all-page, all-frame access and automatic mail-link changes are meaningful design risks, but no exposed privileged interface or dangerous code execution was found.[Q1][Q2][Q8][Q21]
Signs of misuse
No evidence shows tracking, credential collection, hidden collection, remote commands, or code supplied by a remote server; sharing is tied to user actions.[Q7][Q12][Q14][Q16]
Code findings
What access does this extension ask for, and does that access make sense for what it claims to do?
It requests tabs, storage, scripting, and host access to every HTTP and HTTPS page. mailto.js runs automatically in every frame, although its reviewed behavior is limited to mail links.
Declares all-frame, all-site content-script access plus tabs, storage, and scripting. — manifest.json:8-26
Which websites can it run on, and can it read or change what appears on those pages?
It finds every anchor whose href contains mailto:, replaces that href with a Gmail compose URL, and forces the link to open in a new tab. No other page elements are changed.
Converts mailto parameters and rewrites href and target attributes on matching anchors. — mailto.js:10-42
Can it see sensitive information you type, such as passwords, payment details, messages, or form entries?
On a toolbar click it reads selected page text, the current tab title, and the current URL. It also reads recipient, subject, CC, BCC, and body values already present in mailto links, but does not inspect passwords or ordinary forms.
Reads window.getSelection().toString() and sends it to the background. — infopasser.js:8-18
Reads active tab title/URL and creates a Gmail subject/body. — background.js:56-79
Reads and translates the existing mailto URL fields. — mailto.js:10-19, 23-40
Can it access private browser data such as cookies, signed-in sessions, browsing history, bookmarks, or downloads?
It stores the optional Google Workspace domain, subject prefix, and a one-time migration marker in chrome.storage.local. Selected text, tab title, and URL are kept only in background variables while a compose window is created.
Migrates and saves domainName and subjectPrefix. — options.js:1-18, 21-38
Stores hasMigrated after opening the migration options page. — background.js:90-100
Can it access anything else on your device, such as files, location, camera, microphone, clipboard, or installed applications?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Declares none of the device, cookie, native messaging, file, or loopback capabilities. — manifest.json:15-24
Does it send information outside your browser? If so, what information is sent, where does it go, and why?
When the user opens a rewritten mailto link or clicks the extension button, recipient/subject/body data—or selected text, page title, and URL—are placed in a mail.google.com compose URL. No other developer-operated services or telemetry sink exists.
Creates Gmail compose links containing the mailto values. — mailto.js:10-19, 37-42
Creates a Gmail window with encoded subject and body containing the shared selection/URL. — background.js:66-87
Does it download or run code, settings, or instructions supplied by a remote server?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Constructs a fixed mail.google.com compose URL locally. — background.js:8-18, 66-87
Contains only static packaged options UI and a documentation link. — options.html:27-44
Can it take actions without a clear user request, such as opening pages, redirecting searches, downloading files, or sending requests?
It automatically rewrites mailto links on every page. Reading the page title, URL, and selected text and opening a Gmail compose window require the user to click the extension action; there is no periodic or background collection.
Automatically scans and rewrites mailto anchors once the Gmail URL is received. — mailto.js:22-55
Injects the selection reader only from the toolbar click handler. — background.js:56-63
Can it change important browser settings, including your proxy, search engine, homepage, privacy settings, or other extensions?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Declares no browser settings, search, new-tab, proxy, management, or downloads feature. — manifest.json:1-40
Is any important behavior difficult to inspect because the code is hidden, heavily obfuscated, dynamically generated, or supplied by third parties?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Lists background.js, mailto.js, infopasser.js, and options.js as the only application scripts. — inventory.json:files
Does it use eval(), new Function(), or string-based timers to turn text into executable code?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
All execution uses fixed packaged functions and Chrome APIs. — background.js, mailto.js, infopasser.js, options.js:complete scripts
Does it track the websites, pages, searches, or links you visit?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Reads the active tab URL/title only in the action click flow. — background.js:56-79
Scans only mailto anchors and makes no network request. — mailto.js:23-42
Does it create a persistent ID or browser fingerprint to recognize you?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Stores only domainName and subjectPrefix preferences. — options.js:1-38
Does it send cookies, session details, authentication data, or page contents elsewhere?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
No cookies permission is declared. — manifest.json:15-24
Only opens the normal Gmail compose URL and does not access authentication state. — background.js:66-87
Does it record typing, form entries, clipboard contents, or screenshots?
It reads whatever text the user has selected on the active page after the toolbar button is clicked and includes it in the Gmail draft body. It does not monitor keystrokes or read arbitrary form values.
Reads window.getSelection().toString() in the user-triggered injected script. — infopasser.js:8-18
Receives the selection and adds it to the compose body. — background.js:43-47, 66-79
Can a website or remote server send commands that make the extension take actions?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Handles only the fixed GmailUrlPlease port request and the packaged selection message. — background.js:26-47
Does it alter links, referral codes, advertisements, shopping carts, or search results?
It deliberately replaces mailto destinations with Gmail compose links and forces them into a new tab. This is the extension's stated purpose, not hidden affiliate or advertising redirection.
Documents and performs the Gmail mailto rewrite. — mailto.js:3-19, 37-42
The description explicitly advertises making Gmail the default email application. — manifest.json:5-7
Does it redirect or modify web traffic, request headers, downloads, or proxy settings?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
No webRequest or declarativeNetRequest permission is declared. — manifest.json:15-24
Can it communicate with software on the computer or services running on localhost?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
No nativeMessaging permission or loopback host is declared. — manifest.json:15-24
Does it decode, decrypt, or unpack hidden data and then execute or inject it?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
No fetch/XHR/WebSocket or dynamic execution exists. — background.js, mailto.js, infopasser.js, options.js:complete scripts
Can ordinary websites access privileged extension features through messaging or exposed files?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Contains no web_accessible_resources or externally_connectable entry. — manifest.json:1-40
Does suspicious behavior activate only for certain users, websites, dates, or remote settings?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Builds the compose URL from fixed code and local user preferences. — background.js:8-18, 66-79
Saves only the two visible user options. — options.js:21-38
Does it perform hidden resource-intensive work, such as cryptocurrency mining?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Performs a one-time XPath scan after receiving the compose base URL. — mailto.js:23-55
Does it change form fields or where a form sends its information?
No evidence of this behavior was found in the reviewed package.
Rewrites href and target on matching links. — mailto.js:10-19, 23-42
Opens a visible Gmail compose window with a prefilled subject/body. — background.js:66-87